Iran’s Nuclear Program: Strikes Degrade, But Outcome Remains Unclear

Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions Under Fire: A Complex Battlefield

The state of Iran’s nuclear program following a series of intense airstrikes by the United States and Israel remains a subject of significant uncertainty, with experts struggling to assess the full extent of the damage and the program’s future trajectory. The strikes, initiated in mid-2024 and continuing into 2025, targeted key enrichment facilities, including those at Fordo and Natanz, in an effort to dismantle what was perceived as an imminent threat of Iran developing nuclear weapons. However, the true impact of these military actions is far from definitive.

Assessing the Damage: Facilities Bombed, Material Unaccounted For

William El Burke, a veteran of non-proliferation and nuclear weapons control, explained the current understanding of the situation. “The Iranian enrichment facilities… those facilities have been extensively bombed,” he stated. Specifically, the facility at Natanz, described as “especially large and very deeply buried,” required “very special bombs to burrow deep into the ground and destroy the holes.” While these core enrichment facilities bore the brunt of the attacks, other sites like research and power reactors were left untouched. The primary concern remains the material enriched to near-weapons-grade levels.

According to estimates from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) prior to the most recent strikes on June 13th, 2025, Iran possessed approximately 440 kg of uranium enriched to 60% purity, along with significant quantities of 20%, 5%, and 2% enriched uranium. A critical complication is that a substantial portion of this highly enriched material had been moved off-site to a facility in Esfahan. “We don’t know the status of that material and the IAEA has demanded access to it and the Iranians have refused,” Burke noted, highlighting the opacity surrounding the program.

Uncertainty Clouds Program’s Future

The effectiveness of the strikes is difficult to gauge due to a lack of clear baseline information and Iran’s efforts to conceal its activities. “The US statements from June 2025 that said the program was obliterated, which quite frankly was a bit of an overstatement,” Burke commented. The fate of the 440 kg of 60% enriched uranium, enough for an estimated 10 to 12 bombs, remains unknown. It is unclear if Iran has recovered this material, stored it safely elsewhere, or if it remains buried under rubble.

Furthermore, intelligence regarding new facilities being constructed by Iran is also murky. “We don’t know… exactly what was happening there that looks like it was struck by penetrator bombs,” Burke said, referring to a new facility that may have been targeted. The status of other facilities, potentially not yet populated with centrifuges, and whether they have been hit, remains equally unclear. This pervasive uncertainty has led the IAEA Director General, Rafael Grossi, to repeatedly press Iran for access and clarity, which Tehran has largely denied, seeking to shield its program from further military action.

Ground Operations: A Risky Alternative

The possibility of special forces operations to seize nuclear material has been raised, but experts view it as an extremely complex and high-risk undertaking. “If the US or Israel know where that material is, I suspect that they probably would have just destroyed it from the air,” Burke suggested. Sending ground teams into heavily fortified locations carries the potential for massive casualties and is considered a last resort. Such an option might only be contemplated if material is too deeply buried or protected for aerial bombardment to be effective. However, Burke indicated that “there would just be better options right now than to send in commando teams.”

The Path to a Bomb: Severely Hindered, Not Impossible

While fears of Iran being mere weeks away from a nuclear bomb have circulated, the strikes appear to have significantly hampered such a rapid progression. Previously, enriching existing material to weapons-grade (90%) and converting it into a metallic form suitable for a warhead could have taken days to weeks, with the entire process of weaponization and integration onto a missile taking months. This would have required specialized facilities for handling highly enriched uranium and fabricating bomb components.

However, key facilities, including those at Esfahan responsible for converting uranium into metal, have been “wiped out.” Burke stated, “it’s just incredibly difficult considering all the dedicated facilities and equipment they had designed to turn uranium into metal that they could then use to build a bomb – have been destroyed or heavily heavily damaged.” Rebuilding these capabilities would necessitate reconstructing facilities for enrichment, metal conversion, and bomb pit manufacturing, all while operating under intense international scrutiny and the risk of further strikes.

No Evidence of Outside Assistance

Contrary to some speculation, Western intelligence agencies and the IAEA have found no concrete evidence of external support for Iran’s nuclear weaponization efforts. Russia, despite its alliance with Iran, has reportedly been cautious not to cooperate on weaponization, maintaining a stance consistent with IAEA guidelines. Similarly, China, North Korea, and Pakistan are not believed to have provided assistance. Iran, it seems, takes pride in its indigenous scientific capabilities, honed by decades of work since the 1980s, and does not appear to be seeking external help in this domain.

Lessons for Proliferating Nations

The international system’s response to Iran’s nuclear program, while belated in its transparency, has led to strengthened monitoring mechanisms. For any nation contemplating a clandestine nuclear weapons program, the lesson is to operate entirely “off the grid,” completely separate from civilian nuclear activities that attract international scrutiny. Countries like Saudi Arabia, which have expressed interest in nuclear power and uranium enrichment, face such intense oversight that hiding a weapons program within a civilian framework would be virtually impossible. The alternative for aspiring nuclear powers might be to acquire a weapon “off the shelf,” a path fraught with its own geopolitical risks.

Nuclear Weapons: No Panacea for Security

The notion that nuclear weapons inherently guarantee a nation’s security is a dangerous fallacy, according to Burke. “Nuclear weapons are not a magic panacea for nuclear for your country’s security,” he argued. Instead, pursuing them can increase the risk of international aggression. “The idea that a lot of people have that oh if Iran had just raced to a nuclear weapon they would have been safe. No actually they would have been attacked much harder and much earlier,” he concluded, dispelling the myth of nuclear weapons as an immediate shield.

What’s Next?

The international community will be closely watching for any signs of Iran attempting to rebuild its enrichment and weaponization capabilities, particularly its efforts to acquire or process uranium beyond the 60% threshold. The IAEA’s continued demands for access to the Esfahan facility and its stored materials will be crucial. Any indication of clandestine construction or procurement of specialized equipment could trigger renewed international pressure and potentially further military action, leaving the ultimate outcome of Iran’s nuclear ambitions hanging precariously in the balance.

Source: What remains of Iran's nuclear program? | DW News (YouTube)